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Abstract 
 
The economic problems of the 1690s spurred an extraordinary surge in politicised debates 
and complaints about commercial, financial and other material affairs. This article begins by 
examining the magnitude of the shift in economic fortunes between the reigns of James II 
(1685-88) and William III (1689-1702), highlighting the main sources of concern: wartime 
disruption to trade, rising taxes, the currency crisis associated with the recoinage of 1696, and 
the high food prices of 1693-9. More significantly, it assesses the nature and extent of the 
public response. Trade, finance and fiscal impositions became increasingly pervasive topics 
of public conversation and printed debate, as evidenced both in anecdotal reports and in a 
crude but telling analysis of published titles. Moreover, national political divisions – between 
Williamites and Jacobites, Whigs and Tories, Court and Country, anti-French and anti-Dutch 
– were absolutely central to this economic discourse. Perceptions of the monarch and 
parliamentary leaders were directly linked to how people interpreted the hardships of this 
decade. This manifested itself in innumerable short tracts, broadside ballads, seditious 
conversations, riotous protests and many other modes of public communication. Finally, 
through comparisons with earlier and later periods such as the 1540s, 1590s, 1640s and the 
early eighteenth century, this article demonstrates that the tumult of the 1690s had a long-
term impact and has been unjustly neglected in the historiography of economic crisis and 
political conflict. 
 
 
The Politics of Economic Distress in the Aftermath of the Glorious 
Revolution, 1689-1702 
 
For many people, the Revolution of 1688 that brought William III and Mary II to the throne 
seemed to coincide with a sharp reversal in the nation’s economic fortunes. The reign of 
James II was a period of relative plenty and prosperity, but the 1690s were a decade in which 
England faced an unhappy conjunction of war, hunger, currency failure and financial 
dislocation. 
 
A conversation in a shop on London Bridge on 6 June 1696 offers an initial glimpse of how 
people interpreted the distressing conditions of the time. A man named Robert Morgan came 
in to buy a handkerchief and fell to talking with Edmund Baker, the shopkeeper’s apprentice. 
Morgan was apparently angry about the current scarcity of lawful money – he had only old 
clipped shillings – and also questioned the official account of a recent assassination attempt 
against the king. In his eyes, England was a nation in decline: 
‘Was not the tradeing better when King James was here then now?’, asked Morgan. 
‘[T]hen our Lives must have paid for it’, Baker replied. 
‘[O]ur Livelyhoods & Lives goes now’, countered Morgan. 
Here we have the views of both opponents and supporters of the Revolution neatly 
encapsulated. From the perspective of Morgan and many other dissidents, the consequences 
of 1688 were currency shortages, commercial ‘decay’ and the spread of economic misery. In 
contrast, Baker – like most loyal Williamites - saw any material hardships as the necessary 
price paid for securing the nation against James’s bloody tyranny. Yet opponents of the 
revolution thought this naïve. From their standpoint, the new government not only ruined 
trade but also undermined Englishmen’s liberties through secret schemes to stifle opposition. 
For Morgan, the currency crisis and the assassination scare were both part of a nefarious 
‘State plott’ to oppress the ‘Livelyhoods & Lives’ of the English people.1 Although the 
polarised interpretations expressed by Baker and Morgan were hardly the only opinions one 
might encounter on the streets at this time, they epitomise the extent to which political and 
economic concerns became increasingly intermixed in the aftermath of the Revolution. 
 
The apparent conjunction of rapid political and economic change has long preoccupied 
historians of the period. This was, after all, an age that witnessed the ‘financial revolution’, 
the birth of ‘credible commitment’ and the rise of the ‘fiscal-military state’, all of which have 
been dated to 1688-9.
2
 Since these terms were first coined, much subsequent research has 
provided a more nuanced picture that rightly emphasises long-term change rather than 
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focusing primarily on the ‘Glorious Revolution’ itself.3 Yet, the ‘genuinely revolutionary’ 
nature of the period has recently been reasserted.
4
 Political historians such as Tim Harris and 
Steve Pincus have shown that the events of 1688-9 were not the tame, bloodless ‘victory for 
moderation’ presented by Macaulay and Trevelyan – instead they were ‘a messy, violent 
affair’ that ‘effected a very fundamental transformation of the British polity’.5 Pincus has 
gone so far as to claim that England’s political economy experienced a revolutionary 
realignment at this time, whilst economic historians have reiterated the commercial and 
financial impact of the new constitutional balance that emerged in the 1690s.
6
 Some scholars 
have applauded the revolutionaries for laying a foundation for ‘economic growth and political 
freedom’ whereas others have seen them as inaugurating an era of ‘rent-seeking’ and 
escalated slave trading, but nearly all now seem to agree that the revolution did more than 
merely exchange one king for another.
7
 
 
However, only a few historians have looked directly at the economic turmoil that erupted in 
the early years of the new revolutionary regime, and fewer still have examined the political 
implications of that turmoil. Even Pincus, who has offered a lengthy chapter on the 
‘revolution in political economy’, includes only a few paragraphs on the material distress that 
soon followed in the wake of 1688.
8
 So, although recent historians have very effectively 
reasserted the importance of the Revolution, the challenges that confronted the economy in 
the 1690s have barely featured in their narratives. The most notable exception is the 
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painstaking work of D.W. Jones in reconstructing the impact of the Nine Years War. He has 
very carefully assessed the economic damage caused by the conflict, though he has little to 
say about how this related to national politics.
9
 For this, one must turn to the valuable but 
fragmentary insights offered by Henry Horwitz and more recent scholars of the ‘country 
party’ in the 1690s, all of whom include brief discussions of this issue within much broader 
analysis of the political history of the period.
10
 
 
This article is thus an examination of the politicised responses to the difficult conditions that 
unsettled the economy in the years that followed the Revolution. Rather than focusing on the 
well-known stories of the Bank of England or the East India Company, it addresses the 
consequences of less-studied causes of public discontent and partisan conflict such as the 
wartime breakdown of maritime trade and the recurrent food scarcities of 1693-9.
11
 It also 
stretches beyond the ‘high politics’ of parliamentary quarrels and partisan tracts to analyse 
the ‘popular politics’ of seditious complaints and grain riots.12 By exploring how the difficult 
conditions of these ‘ill years’ were experienced, interpreted and politicised, this article 
contributes directly to the wider scholarly conversation about political volatility and 
economic distress. Indeed, part of the argument advanced here is that the perilous situation 
that confronted William’s government can be fruitfully compared to earlier and later episodes 
that have received much more attention. As with the ‘commotion times’ of the late 1540s, the 
tumultuous conditions of the 1590s, the revolutionary upheavals of the 1640s, the Wilkite 
unrest of the 1760s and the Jacobin agitation of 1800-1, it is clear that England in the 1690s 
suffered from a disorder that afflicted both her polity and her economy.
13
 Yet, whereas many 
previous studies have discussed the other major crises that repeatedly struck England from 
the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the crisis of the 1690s has been relegated to the 
margins of the historiography. 
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 The problems of William’s reign are here considered from four angles. The first section very 
briefly assesses the magnitude of the shift in economic fortunes experienced by those who 
lived through the revolution and its aftermath. The second surveys the increasing 
pervasiveness of trade, finance and social distress as topics of public conversation and printed 
debate. The third section demonstrates the centrality of national political divisions in these 
discussions, showing how contemporaries understood and explained the hardships of the era 
in often explicitly partisan terms. The fourth examines how this politicisation of economic 
issues manifested itself in the responses of rioting crowds and of the state itself, including 
both the royal court and parliament. Finally, the article concludes with a brief consideration 
of the long-term impact of these events, for their imprint could still be seen in the contentious 
debates and violent confrontations of the eighteenth century. 
  
 
* * * * * 
 
 
For much of the population, life under William III was strikingly different from the 
circumstances they had previously enjoyed. Economic conditions under Charles II and James 
II were far from perfect, but their reigns still stand out as an era of exceptional wealth and 
comfort when compared to much of the rest of the early modern period. By late 1688, for 
example, England had enjoyed many years of peace with her European neighbours. Since the 
end of the Anglo-Dutch wars in 1674, no major international conflicts had curtailed trade or 
pushed up the level of taxation. Instead, commerce was growing steadily and labouring 
people saw their wages rise significantly.
14
 In addition, no financial crisis had shaken the City 
since the Stop of the Exchequer in 1672, thanks partly to the crown gaining an increasingly 
secure financial position through ever-rising customs revenues.
15
 Perhaps most importantly of 
all, several decades of relatively good harvests had allowed people to become accustomed to 
cheap provisions. W.G. Hoskins characterised the 1680s as a time of ‘marvellous bounty’ and 
calculated that there was not a single ‘deficient harvest’ over the whole decade.16 In fact, the 
late 1680s witnessed some of the most plentiful years on record which gave wage-earners the 
opportunity to devote more of their income to ‘petty luxuries’.17 As a result, according to the 
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Tory economic thinker Charles Davenant, under James II there was ‘no country in the world 
where the inferior rank of men were . . . more at their ease’.18 
 
The problems were often thought to have begun on 17 May 1689, when William III and Mary 
II declared war on France merely a month after they had been crowned and six months after 
William had landed with his army at Torbay. The conflict with Europe’s greatest military 
power brought swarms of hostile warships and privateers that heavily damaged English 
maritime trade. Reports from the coasts related that ‘not a Ship can Stir’ and the losses ‘put a 
great Stop to Trade’.19 Indeed, the impact of war can be roughly measured: shipping figures 
indicate a 50 or 60 per cent drop in foreign trade by the early 1690s and coastwise traffic 
suffered too.
20
 At the same time, the Williamite state had to extract ever more revenue to pay 
for its military commitments, leading to a doubling of the tax burden through new or higher 
duties on imports, exports, land, salt, beer, malt, stamps, births, burials, marriages and much 
else besides.
21
 Alongside depressed trade and increased fiscal pressure, the war also provoked 
a major currency crisis. The physical state of English coinage had long been poor, but from 
1689 it began to  be degraded at an even more alarming rate through illicit ‘clipping’ and 
‘coining’ spurred primarily by the demand for bullion for remittances to fund the war effort 
on the continent. This dangerous situation led the government to try a radical remedy – it 
attempted to re-mint the nation’s entire stock of silver coins over the course of merely a few 
months.
22
 However, the government failed spectacularly to produce enough new coin to 
replace the old before the statutory deadline of 4 May 1696. Vast sums of money suddenly 
became unusable and within days there was a run on the recently founded Bank of England. 
The lack of useable cash and the unreliability of paper notes created a liquidity crisis. Buying 
and selling became unmanageable, payment of wages became impossible, and much 
domestic commerce essentially seized up.
23
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 Increasing commercial and monetary troubles were accompanied by a brutal spike in the 
price of necessities, especially food and fuel. All across the kingdom, the price of wheat 
began to climb in the very year that William and Mary took the throne and it continued to 
mount until it reached levels not seen in decades, where it stayed through most of the 1690s.
24
 
The figures from specific towns show this pattern unmistakably. In Cambridge’s 
marketplace, for example, wheat was cheap in the late 1680s, with a low of only 18s per 
quarter in November 1688, the very month of William’s ‘providential’ arrival in England. 
Yet it rose thereafter so that by February 1694 it had climbed to 60s, well over three times the 
rate at the Revolution, and the price reached a still higher peak of 64s in July 1698.
25
 For less 
affluent men and women, this sharp inflation was more than noteworthy – it was potentially 
deadly. In the harsh winter of 1693-4, for instance, ‘all things [were] so deare and scarse for 
the belly’ at Oxford ‘that 30 honest dwellers in S. Marie’s parish crave almes and weekly 
sustenance’. The poor, it was said, ‘eat turnips instead of bread’.26 
 
The impact of these problems was, of course, not spread evenly. Those who suffered most 
were the ‘poorer sort’ who spent a larger share of their income on food, especially town-
dwellers and rural textile workers.
27
 Likewise, the many traders and manufacturers whose 
income came from overseas trade were disproportionately afflicted, whereas those involved 
in supplying the military tended to advance their fortunes. There were also regional contrasts. 
London and the south east saw the largest increases in wheat price in 1693-94, whereas 
Exeter, Cambridge, Lincoln and York experienced the peaks in 1696-99 and northern 
England was also more affected by the peak in the cost of oats and rye in 1698-99.
28
 Finally, 
it must also be acknowledged that the problems associated with the recoinage were 
concentrated in the middle of the decade and seem to have been most severe in western and 
northern counties. But despite this variation, it is clear that people in every corner of the 
country felt the pinch of hardship for much of William III’s reign. 
 
The high prices and commercial turmoil had a potentially disastrous effect on household 
budgets and no one who lived through these years could have missed the contrast with 
previous decades. Indeed, the combined human impact of these repeated economic shocks 
can be heard clearly in the words of Richard Newnam, a tradesman from the cloth-making 
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town of Tiverton in Devon, who published an obscure pamphlet entitled The Complaint of 
English Subjects in 1699.
29
 He recounted in great detail how ‘necessary Provisions were then 
extream Dear’ at the very moment when ‘the scarcity of Money’ was at its worst: 
O! were not those Times meer Starving Time? yes, they were, and I believe that then 
at that time, many Hundreds, if not Thousand, throughout England, gradually were 
then mearly Starved to Death; for with my own Eyes did I then see, in our said Town 
of Tiverton in Devonshire, many Poor, Weak, Languishing Creatures, then walking up 
and down the Street, and many of them in a short time after that Dyed, whose 
Distempers originally, (I believe) first proceeded from no other Causes than from the 
want of Necessary Food.
30
 
Newman’s vision of the 1690s as ‘Starving Times’ ‘throughout England’ was mistaken: there 
was no national or even regional ‘subsistence crisis’ at this time.31 However, the evidence 
presented above, both statistical and anecdotal, suggest that the cloth-workers of Tiverton 
were not the only people to experience a visible decline in living standards in the aftermath of 
the Revolution.
32
 The records of this era show an unmistakable awareness of the fact that 
these were years when economic conditions had suddenly changed for the worse. 
 
 
* * * * * 
 
 
The Complaint of English Subjects epitomized many of the broader changes in the way 
contemporaries interpreted and discussed economic concerns. The pamphlet was the product 
of a decade in which debates about commercial, financial and fiscal problems became more 
direct and more public than ever before. Rather than remaining a manuscript privately 
circulated amongst a small network of acquaintances or quietly dispatched to a royal official, 
it was printed and sold in London in at least two editions and was undoubted designed for a 
wider readership.
33
 Newnam’s Complaint exemplifies the way economic distress emerged as 
a central topic of public discussion after the Revolution. Whether expressed in speech, 
manuscript or print, everyone seemed to have an opinion. 
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The debates of the 1690s arose in the context of increasingly open and critical discussion of 
political and economic issues.
34
 Political argument became ever more frequent and wide-
ranging over the course of the seventeenth century through repeated waves of printing mania 
during the Civil Wars, the Interregnum and the Exclusion Crisis. This culminated in a 
permanent shift towards openly partisan discussions of state policy after the Revolution of 
1688 and the lapse of the Licencing Act in 1695. As a result, ‘paper warfare’ between 
political antagonists entered the nation’s cultural mainstream in the 1690s.35 Whilst much of 
this concerned long-established issues such as religious minorities or constitutional powers, 
an increasing share of commentary and complaint focused on economic affairs. 
 
Obviously previous eras had seen occasionally intense arguments about commercial policy 
and related issues. During the tumultuous years of the late 1540s, for example, heated 
discussions of dearth and enclosure can be found amongst gentlemen in parliament, preachers 
in pulpits and commoners in alehouses.
36
 This pattern was repeated during the hard times of 
the 1590s, perhaps accentuated by the government’s very public campaigns for intensified 
market regulation and poor relief.
37
 When England was again afflicted by widespread 
economic dislocation in the unsettled 1640s, complaints and proposals circulated even more 
widely through pamphlets, newsbooks and petitions. As early as February 1642, for example, 
1,500 London porters and ‘many hundreds’ of ‘distressed women’ petitioned the House of 
Commons about the great ‘necessity’ afflicting them during the commercial slump – what’s 
more, both petitions were published and thus may have reached broad audience.
38
 Indeed, one 
can find moments throughout the early modern period when economic concerns sparked 
widespread discussion and mobilisation.
39
 Yet, in the final decade of the seventeenth century 
the surge of public debate about economic conditions rapidly matched and then exceeded the 
levels reached by the previous crises. Moreover, as will be seen later, such arguments seem to 
have been more overtly politicised than ever before. 
 
The contributions of certain economic thinkers are well-known, exemplified in Gregory King 
and Charles Davenant’s use of ‘political arithmetick’ to calculate the financing of the war as 
well as in John Locke and Isaac Newton’s debates about resolving the currency crisis.40 Such 
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learned discourse nonetheless represents only a few voices in a cacophony of contending 
opinions on ‘the state and condition of England’ at this time. Of course many people 
continued to express themselves on such matters without resorting to the printing press. As 
early as December of 1689, for instance, Anthony Wood remarked that, with ‘Money dead’ 
and ‘no trading’, ‘all complaine for these three months last past; occasioned by taxes, [and] 
warrs’.41 The ‘general complaints’ continued into the early 1690s, when ‘the heaviness of 
taxes’ ensured that ‘everybody was anxious about affairs of state’, according to another 
observer.
42
 By the middle of the decade currency problems had come to the fore, providing 
an apparently limitless source of public debate. Edward Clarke, writing from London, 
confirmed to his wife Elizabeth in Somerset that ‘your conversation in the country is much on 
the same subject with us here; the businesse of money being here, as with you, the begining 
or end of all discourses whatsoever, and is the comon subject of all conversation’.43 
Alongside conversations in alehouses and coffeehouses, opinions on economic policy also 
spread through ballads sung ‘To the Tune of Let Mary live long’ and through seditious libels 
anonymously copied by hand because ‘he that writ this durst not owne it’.44 People even 
found non-verbal ways of expressing their discontent. On the third anniversary of William 
and Mary’s inauguration, for example, Oxford witnessed ‘ringing of bells and some 
illuminations in the High Street, etc. Not so much as formerly; people discontented at paying 
many taxes.’45 Nonetheless, it was the output of London’s printers that showed most clearly 
the new prominence of commerce and finance as subjects of heated discussion. 
 
Printed media took many forms at this time, ranging from regular newspapers and ephemeral 
broadsheets to lengthy pamphlets and weighty tomes, all of which included information and 
arguments about economic affairs. Such themes were, for example, a major part of the revival 
of the periodical press in the 1690s. Of course, these issues still featured frequently in the 
long-established medium of manuscript newsletters circulated amongst educated gentlemen 
in the metropolis and the counties.
46
 However, news and commentary on the state of the 
economy also reached a much wider audience through John Houghton’s weekly Collection 
for the Improvement of Husbandry and Trade (1692-1703), the first ever periodical to focus 
exclusively on this subject, and the expanding number of other printed newspapers that 
mentioned merchant shipping, joint-stock subscriptions, grain prices, the state of the coinage 
and even the paying of naval arrears.
47
 Likewise, single-sheet publications commonly 
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addressed economic concerns. This was a recurrent subject in the era’s broadside ballads and 
in many short printed ‘proposals’ for state-sponsored projects to raise funds or improve 
trading.
48
 Merchants, manufacturers and other groups also took advantage of the presses to 
amplify their voices when they appealed to Parliament to redress their economic grievances. 
The vast expansion in the number of petitions about mercantile issues received by the House 
of Commons after 1688 attests to the importance of this mode of communication – whereas 
there were only 100 in the three decades after the Restoration, this figure rose to nearly 600 
from 1690 to 1702.
49
 Furthermore, whilst many petitions remained manuscripts read only in 
Westminster, others were published and thus often received a wider circulation.
50
 The 
expansion of print also enabled critics of the regime to reach many more readers than they 
would have if they had relied solely on scribal transmission. Hence, in London, ‘great 
numbers of scandalous papers reflecting on the miscarriages of the Turky fleet … were 
thrown about the streets’ in September 1693, and ‘a libell [was] flung up and down the 
streets’ in response to the royal proclamation on the recoinage in December 1695.51 It seems 
that the economy featured more prominently in practically every type of publication in the 
aftermath of the Revolution. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
A crude quantitative analysis supports this impression. The frequent occurrence of ‘trade’, 
‘money’ and ‘tax’ amongst the titles of texts published in the 1690s suggests that such issues 
had become a central topic of reading and conversation for the literate gentlemen and 
townsmen who comprised ‘the public’ in early modern England.52 Nearly 800 titles included 
at least one of these keywords in this decade, together amounting to four per cent of all 
publications, a figure far higher than almost every other decade in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries (Figure 1).
53
 Compared to the 1680s, mentions of ‘trade’ and ‘money’ 
increased by more than threefold whilst ‘tax’ leapt to almost five times its previous 
proportion. Moreover, the suddenly increased interest in these sorts of economic issues 
largely continued, at a lower rate, throughout the early eighteenth century. Although ‘money’ 
soon lost much of its prominence, ‘tax’ and ‘trade’ continued to be mentioned quite regularly, 
which suggests that William III’s reign was a key phase in a longer transition as well as a 
period of acute concern in itself. Of course quantitative analysis of publication titles can 
provide only a very rough measure of public interest in a topic. Phil Withington, from whom 
this method derives, has demonstrated its value and discussed its limitations at much greater 
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length than possible here.
54
 Ultimately, these figures offer a useful preliminary sketch of the 
changing resonance of specific issues, but the newfound significance of economic conditions 
in public debate after the Revolution only becomes clear through an analysis of the texts 
themselves and of the wider discussions in which they featured. 
 
 
* * * * * 
 
 
Interpreting the ‘hard times’ of the 1690s came easily to contemporaries. They had a 
multitude of explanations for such events, including many that had been used by their 
predecessors decades or even centuries earlier.
55
 Yet, a significant number of people offered 
explanations that made sense only in the context of the Revolution of 1688. For them, the 
causes were political rather than natural or divine. In some cases, polemicists addressed the 
economic situation with such aggressive rhetoric and brazen partisanship that they seemed to 
threaten the very stability of the state. As a result, just as in 1540s and 1640s, this was a 
moment when economic and political debate became tightly entangled. 
 
In most earlier moments of severe economic strain, public commentary tended to avoid 
discussing the role of the political regime in Westminster. During the dearth and dislocation 
in the latter part of Elizabeth’s reign, there were a few isolated claims that the poor might be 
better under a Spanish king and enclosure was apparently a factor in an election at Leicester 
in 1597, but most complaints were more in keeping with ‘the politics of Cockayne’ than the 
politics of court faction or royal succession.
56
 Similarly non-partisan reactions greeted the 
‘depression’ of the early 1620s and the more minor problems of the mid 1670s.57 However, 
there were important exceptions, namely the 1540s and 1640s. Under Edward VI, the 
legitimacy of Protector Somerset’s government was intimately tied to its handling of the 
economic problems of the time, with outspoken ‘commonwealthmen’, well-organised 
‘camps’ of commoners and Somerset’s aristocratic opponents all contributing to a climate of 
open political contention about the harsh conditions faced by the peasantry.
58
 A century later, 
this dangerous convergence was repeated. Many people interpreted the material problems of 
the 1640s – including disrupted trade, new taxes and high prices – through an explicitly 
                                                          
54
 Withington, Society, esp. pp. 7-9. The potential weaknesses of this method are discussed in various reviews of 
this book, especially that of Tim Hitchcock in Economic History Review, 64:3 (2011), pp. 1026-7. 
55
 For examples of people blaming traditional targets such as middlemen, immigrants and sinners, see Essex 
Record Office, T/A 465/268, unfol. (28 Apr 1693), T/A 156/1, unfol. (18 May 1693), D/DBm Z10, p. 2; TNA, 
CO 388/3, fos. 165-6 (1694); CO 388/5/57-58, /63-64; CO 391/7, pp. 264-5 (1694); SALS, Q\SO/8, fo. 248; 
YCA, F.10, p. 56; LMA, COL/CA/01/01/102, pp. 273-8; NRO, NCR Case 16a/25, fo. 322; Bodl., MS. Eng. 
Hist. b.209, fo. 25; Luttrell, Relation, III. 233, 282; Wood, Life, III. 434, 488; D. Statt, Foreigners and 
Englishmen: The Controversy over Immigration and Population, 1660-1760 (Newark, DE, 1995), pp. 96-7, 
114-19, 180-2, 184; Newnam, Complaint, pp. 22, 65-6; R. Dunning, Bread for the Poor (1693), p. 4; Claydon, 
Godly Revolution, esp. pp. 130-1; Rose, 1690s, pp. 196-7; B. Waddell, God, Duty and Community in English 
Economic Life (Woodbridge, 2012), pp. 31, 34, 57-8, 61-2, 66-8, 112, 121-2, 128, 136-7, 157, 167, 214-5, 220, 
233. 
56
 Sharpe, ‘Social strain’, pp. 199-200; Walter, ‘Rising’, pp. 100, 108, 135. See also the politically ambiguous 
threats against the Lord Mayor of London:  I. Archer, The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan 
London (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 1-2, 5-6. 
57
 B. Supple, Commercial Crisis and Change in England, 1660-1642: A Study in the Instability of a Mercantile 
Economy (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 58-64, 198-221; J. Spurr, England in the 1670s:’This Masquerading Age’ 
(Oxford, 2000), pp. 119-126; Waddell, God, Duty and Community, p. 34, 220. 
58
 Wood, 1549, ch. 1, 3-4; E. Shagan, ‘Protector Somerset and the 1549 Rebellions: New Sources and New 
Perspectives’, English Historical Review 144:455 (1999), pp. 34-63. 
partisan lens. At the beginning of the decade, agitators were already claiming that the 
scheming of prelates and papists was the cause of the decay of trade. Indeed, the two petitions 
of 1642 cited earlier both blamed the ‘adverse malignant-blood-sucking rebellious popish 
party’ for the heightened distress of the poor.59 Likewise, later in the decade, the new excise 
was condemned as oppressive and tyrannical by both Levellers and royalists, whilst dearth 
reportedly led the poor ‘to crye up a Kingly government’.60 Yet, even in the midst of the most 
rancorous conflict in England’s history, economic problems were not invariably politicised. 
The famous excise riot at Smithfield in 1647 was, according to Mike Braddick, distinctly 
non-partisan, with radicals failing to exploit the issue as much as might be expected, and the 
same was true of the dearth at this time. Instead, ‘conservative’ and ‘traditional’ reactions 
probably predominated.
61
 
 
Like its Elizabethan and early Stuart predecessors, the Williamite court and its allies often 
endorsed traditional interpretations that placed responsibility for the ‘hard times’ on greedy 
middlemen or pervasive immorality. Indeed, the regime stressed these possibilities in its 
official pronouncements, allowing it to redirect the concerns of its subjects towards 
conventional targets who could be disciplined through long-established legal measures.
62
 
However, Williamites also addressed the political implications of the economic situation 
much more directly and distinctively. An anonymous pamphlet entitled The Pretences of the 
French Invasion Examined, which was conspicuously licenced by the secretary of state and 
usually attributed to the prominent Bishop of St Asaph, William Lloyd, illustrates a common 
approach. It was James II, not the new monarchs, who ‘hath intangled us in a War with the 
worst Enemy in Europe’, claimed the author. By joining with the French in an attempt to 
reverse the Revolution, James had made the military spending ‘absolutely necessary to our 
Safety’ and, in any case, 
what Grievances are these Taxes, in comparison of what is laid on the French Slaves, 
into whose Condition we were intended to be brought? There is a vast difference 
between losing our Property for ever, and paying some part of our Profits to secure 
the rest, and our Inheritances to our Posterity as well as our Selves. 
Furthermore, according to the pamphlet, the decay of trade actually began under James and 
commerce had only remained ‘at a low Ebb’ due to the repeated military assaults launched 
against the new regime from Europe. It was apparently plain that 
the late King feared and hated the increase of Trade, which made him use all means to 
hinder it; and all the World sees, that no Absolute Monarch (as he affects to be,) likes 
that his Subjects should grow rich by Trade. But our present King so soon as he can 
have Peace, will make it his first Care to promote Trade here, as he did in the Country 
he came from; and even in the difficult times he had, Trade hath been a great part of 
his and his Parliaments Care.
63
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Here, the Catholic absolutism of James II and Louis XIV was portrayed both as the cause of 
England’s current economic hardship and as a threat to her future prosperity.64 Other 
Williamite loyalists placed the blame on domestic, rather than foreign, Jacobitism. During the 
re-coinage, for example, one frustrated government supporter responded to a seditious 
manuscript with a note claiming that ‘our Coyne it is defast / By Jacobitish knaves’, and a 
ballad writer described the disruptive practice of weighing old money as a ‘Plot’ by a 
‘Jacobitish Crew’ of ‘sneaking Rebels’.65 These authors saw the maladies afflicting the 
economy as disorders inflicted by opponents of the regime, suggesting that the pain of high 
taxes and commercial disruption were part of a grand strategy for seizing power and reducing 
the country to a slave of popish absolutism.  
 
Supporters of the revolution did not limit themselves to blaming Jacobitism for their 
misfortunes. They also emphasised seemingly positive aspects of the new economic climate 
and depicted their opponents as partisan propagandists. The Prince of Orange himself, in a 
speech to local gentlemen only a few days after his landing in November 1688, declared that 
his purpose was to rescue England’s Protestants ‘by Restoring them to their Rights and 
Properties Established by Law, and by Promoting of Peace and Trade, which is the Soul of 
Government, and the very Life-Blood of a Nation’.66 At the beginning of William’s reign, 
many thought the end of James’s rule would bring a new era of liberty and prosperity. ‘The 
Nation’, wrote the merchant James Whiston in 1689, has been ‘redrest and secured against 
Tyranny and Oppression’, which will ‘greatly improve our Riches, increase the Inhabitants, 
and thereby much lesson the burthen of Taxes’.67 Even the rapid arrival of war and its 
immediate impact on trade could be seen as a potential blessing. In one of his later pamphlets, 
Whiston claimed that, if properly managed, ‘War must be more Beneficial to us than Peace’, 
because it upturned the previously injurious balance of trade with France, halted the import of 
‘Trifles in Lieu of vast sums of sterling’, and encouraged advantageous trading with 
England’s allies on the continent.68 Other observers agreed, arguing that the conflict had 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
see M. Knights, ‘A City Revolution: The Remodelling of the London Livery Companies in the 1680s’, English 
Historical Review, 112:449 (1997), pp. 1155-69, 1173-5 
64
 For other examples, see Mercurius Reformatus or The New Observator, 8 Oct. 1690, Issue 13; J. Dunton, 
Englands Alarum (1693), p. 19; J. Whiston, A Discourse of the decay of trade (1693), pp. 7-9; Anon., Awake 
Sampson, the Philistines are upon thee (1696), pp. 8, 13-15, 18. Similarly, a diarist in Lincolnshire recorded 
verses by a neighbouring minister that described James’s reign as a tyranny in which freemen lost their land, 
misers their gold, merchants their trade, and seamen their employment: Pryme, Diary, p. 179n. The same diarist 
believed that the disruption caused by the recoinage ‘was most certainly a French trick’ to – in the supposed 
words of Louis XIV - ‘set the English doggs together by the ears’: Pryme, Diary, pp. 136-7. See also the 
allegations of a French plot to undermine the lustring trade: TNA, CO 388/5/55-57, /81-83, /87, /89 (1695-6). 
65
 TNA, PL 27/2, part 1, unfol. (‘Lebell per Saxon’, c.1696); Conscience by Scruples, And Money by Ounces 
(1697). Interestingly, the ballad also blamed the Welsh (‘Taffys tribe’) and the Quakers, denouncing both as 
‘Rebels’, which fit with the reputations of these groups for Jacobite sympathies: C. Wood, ‘The Welsh Response 
to the Glorious Revolution of 1688’, Journal of Welsh Religious History, new ser., 1 (2001); P.K. Monod, 
Jacobitism and the English People, 1688-1788 (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 155-8. Likewise, Edward Clarke, the 
Whig M.P., lamented ‘all the difficulties that the enemies to the king and government have wilfully and 
maliciously brought upon the nation in reforming the coin’ and one of his correspondents believed that local 
Catholics had encouraged coin clipping: SALS, DD\SF/7/1/53, unfol. (Bridgwater, Somerset, 17 Aug 1696), 
DD\SF/7/1/73 (16 Dec 1696). See also HMC: Downshire, I, pt. ii. 713; Pincus, 1688, pp. 458-9; Knights, 
Representation, p. 315. 
66
 The speech of the Prince of Orange, to some principle gentlemen of Somersetshire and Dorsetshire (Exeter, 
1688). 
67
 J. Whiston, To the Honourable the Commons … A short account of one of the grand grievances of the nation 
(1689), p. 1. See also the pamphlets claiming that, despite the war, ‘there is little sign of Poverty’ and ‘the body 
of the Nation … never lived so great as now’: W. Gallaway, Reflections upon Mr. Johnson’s notes (1694), pp. 
40-1; Awake Sampson, pp. 14-15; A vindication of the proceedings of the late Parliament (1690), pp. 5-6. 
68
 Whiston, Discourse, p. 10. 
brought technological discoveries sparked by ‘necessitous ingenuity’ and the establishment of 
new ‘manufactorys’, all of which lead ‘to the enriching of this nation’.69 Even the 
government’s handling of the coinage problems occasionally received praise. One ballad, for 
example, noted the multitude of problems caused by the poor state of the currency, but then 
announced that ‘good King William’ was now taking care to reform the coin, which would 
bring ‘satisfaction all over the Land’ for soon ‘Trade will flourish a[g]ain’.70 
 
Yet, many of the texts that optimistically lauded the advantages of William’s rule or 
condemned the economic dangers of Catholic absolutism were merely reacting to more 
pessimistic interpretations of material conditions that were circulating at this time. Hence, 
more than one of the apologists for the Williamite regime attempted to discredit critical views 
as fabrications propagated by the nation’s enemies for political gain. The Pretences of the 
French Invasion Examined again provides an outstanding example: 
the late Reign is magnified by the Jesuits and their Tools, and this blackned: Freedom 
from Taxes then is made a rare Instance of his Gentleness, and the present 
Impositions heightned with all the Rhetorick imaginable, to represent this King as an 
Oppressor. The flourishing of Trade then is extolled, the decay of it now odiously 
insinuated, and great hopes are given of Golden Days, upon the Return of James the 
Just; he is to make us all happy.
71
 
Nor was this the only pamphlet devoted to refuting the complaints of the ‘disaffected’. One 
loyal satirist poked fun at the ‘very shrew’d Politicians’ who spent all their time bewailing 
how ‘our Trade [is] lost, Taxes increas’d, [and] the Nation impoverished’. The author 
disparaged such men for stirring up disloyalty through their ‘unreasonable murmerings’ and 
‘Fallacious Sophisms of Argument’.72 Sir Richard Cocks, a Whig MP, spoke in very similar 
terms in his charges to the Gloucestershire grand jury in 1694. He condemned those who 
undermined the king ‘by their telling false news’ and ‘by their rejoicing at misfortunes’, 
singling out individuals who complained of taxes when ‘we live thanks be to god in plenty’ 
or who ‘pretend their majesties have an inclination to the stranger’ when William cared for 
his English subjects with the same tenderness as ‘the good Samaritan’.73 For proponents of 
the new regime, any grumbling about the state of the economy was regarded with suspicion 
as it might be a ploy to spread discontent or outright sedition. 
 
Not all critical interpretations of the country’s changing economic circumstances were 
disloyal or even partisan. Many regarded the king as entirely faultless and instead blamed 
current afflictions on corruption and mismanagement amongst high-ranking officials within 
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the rapidly expanding institutions of the fiscal-military state.
74
 Particularly hated were the 
‘new men’ who seemed to grow rich by redirecting into their own pockets the millions of 
pounds appropriated to the Navy after the Revolution. For example, Robert Crosfeild and 
William Hodges together published at least twenty pamphlets denouncing ‘a certain Cabal of 
Men’ who ‘have made a prey of the publick all this War’ and ‘desired to turn the War into a 
Trade, and to squeese out even the very Marrow of the People to Inrich themselves’.75 They 
claimed that the extortions and oppressions of men in the Navy Board and the Admiralty had 
led to the decay of maritime commerce, the financial ruin of tens of thousands of naval 
seamen, the rise in pauperism and poor rates, and a multitude of other miseries.
76
 Another 
group deemed guilty of growing rich through the country’s misfortunates were the well-
connected agents who ran England’s growing fiscal apparatus. One anonymous broadsheet 
alleged that the most ‘great and successful Plotters against our Trade and Credit’ were ‘the 
Men in great Places’, especially post-holders in the Treasury, the Customs House, the Excise 
Office and the Bank of England.
77
 Richard Newnam’s Complaint offered a similar diagnosis. 
He saw the king and his subjects robbed by a criminal alliance of ‘great Monyed-Men’ – 
including tax commissioners, bankers, merchants and coiners – who impoverished ‘the 
middle and poorer sort of People’ by manipulating the currency during the recoinage.78 Here, 
the economic weakness that followed the Revolution was caused by a conspiracy amongst 
powerful officeholders and financiers. Furthermore, although all these ‘rich, topping, 
towering Men’ had all taken the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, their nefarious acts 
would ‘pull down true Religion, and overthrow the King, and ruin our Country’.79 In contrast, 
Newnam believed that his own role was to protect the political gains of 1688. He dedicated 
the pamphlet to King William and ‘the most Honourable Parliament’, describing himself as a 
‘true Loyal Subject’ and ‘devoted Servant’ of ‘my King and Country’. Indeed, he 
apologetically declared that he only wrote about the kingdom’s economic afflictions because 
they meant that ‘all your Majesty’s faithful Subjects’ were ‘now much more liable to the 
malice of Enemies’.80 In the rough ‘verses’ at the end of his tract, Newnam warned that the 
government’s foes could take advantage of these ‘hard times’, because 
pinching, pineing, starving, Misery, 
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Hereafter (may) drive, some, from Loyalty.
81
 
His poetry might have been dreadful, but his concern was well-founded. Many men and 
women seem to have turned against their new rulers at least partly because of the 
deteriorating economic conditions in the wake of the Revolution. Moreover, just as he and 
other Williamites had predicted, many opponents of the new political establishment, 
including disgruntled Tories and overt Jacobites, did not hesitate to cite the spread of 
‘Misery’ as an indictment of the regime. Unlike Newnam, they explicitly criticised England’s 
rulers for seemingly bringing the country to the brink of ruin. 
 
The constitutional shifts that followed William’s arrival in 1688 placed Parliament at the 
absolute centre of the national political scene, substantially heightening the public scrutiny of 
both the institution as a whole and its individual members. Thus, as the economic climate 
worsened, some contemporaries traced the cause to the incompetence or malevolence of their 
representatives in Westminster. The Acts passed in 1695 and 1696 ‘for remedying the Ill 
State of the Coin’ drew extraordinary attention to Parliament’s role in commercial and 
monetary affairs, which in turn led to widespread criticism.
82
 ‘Most people’ were reportedly 
‘mightily dissatisiyed’ when the shortage of currency became acute in the summer of 1696 – 
they loved the king, but ‘they curse this parliament … for their ill management’.83 The extent 
of popular anger can be seen in the sad tale of a ‘carefull honest pedlar woman’ from a 
village near Hull. Over years of trading she had gathered a decent sum of money, so when the 
Recoinage Act decreed that her old clipped coin was no longer legal tender she cut her throat 
in despair. Her neighbours, though, questioned ‘whether this woman be guilty of her death or 
no’ and suggested that she had actually been murdered by ‘the parlament men’.84 The 
clergyman Hugh Todd, writing from London at almost the same time, provided a succinct 
assessment of the critical view: ‘The scarcity of Money is the great News & some say we 
want Politicks as much as Coin’.85 
 
His words hint at the wave of partisanship that swiftly flooded into economic debates under 
William III, for Todd was a steadfast Tory. As such, he doubtlessly believed that the blame 
lay especially heavily on one particular group of ‘Politicks’, namely the Whigs who 
dominated government at this time.
86
 Another example of partisan reasoning come in a letter 
sent to the Tory M.P. Sir Joseph Williamson from one of his constituents in the borough of 
Rochester on 23 November 1696. He spoke vividly of the ‘Complaints & Outcrys of the 
People’ against the ‘Cruel Hardships’ occasioned by the recoinage, particularly condemning 
Parliament’s adoption of the measures proposed by the radical Whig John Locke. The letter 
concluded with the hope that the electorate would be ‘more Cautious for the future in the 
Choyce of their Representatives’, because ‘if others had made so Wise a Choyce as Wee of 
this City have done the Nation would not have been reduced to this Miserable Condition’.87 
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Likewise, partisan opponents of Edward Clarke, the Whig M.P. and vocal supporter of 
Locke’s monetary views, faulted him both for the currency problems and for new fiscal 
impositions such as the malt tax.
88
 In the minds of many Tories, the economic troubles that 
had sprung up in England since the Revolution had their roots in the political philosophy and 
financial policy of the Whigs. 
 
Relatedly, some critics focused their censure on a particular breed of government supporter in 
Parliament – the placeman. Because of the potentially lucrative state offices that they held, 
these men seemingly had every incentive to support policies that would protect their own 
positions rather than promote the common good. Their detractors, sometimes grouped under 
the label of the ‘Country’ party, thought that it was this pernicious practice which had 
allowed so many economic maladies to spread.
89
 This view is exemplified in an anonymous 
Letter to a Countrey-Gentleman published soon after the end of the war with France. The 
author complained that whilst the king had been risking his own safety fighting for liberty on 
the continent, the grievances of his subjects had been neglected by a corrupt and idle 
parliament. Under the eyes of the placemen, trade was utterly ruined, sailors barbarously 
oppressed, smuggling actively encouraged and even the royal mint criminally subverted, all 
of which ought to show the English people 
the absolute necessity there is of Chusing Gentlemen of good Estates to be their 
Representatives, as have not been in any (or long since declin'd) Publick 
Employment, during the late War, there being no other means possible, whereby to 
make them sensible of these past Miscarriages, or we to have such Members as will 
be able to rectify them, and do the King and Kingdom Justice, Publick Leaks being 
not to be stopt by the hands that made them.
90
 
A broadside ballad printed during the war told much the same story, recounting the spread of 
poverty across the land through burdensome taxes, dead trading, high prices and needy 
immigrants. It too claimed that the pitiable multitudes complained ‘in vain’ because ‘E'ery 
Time-serving Elf, / Builds a Nest for himself’ by ‘pinching the Poor’ and ‘increasing his 
Store’.91 Such a cynical view of parliamentarians often, but not always, overlapped with the 
anti-Whig predispositions that had led Hugh Todd to conclude that England lacked true-
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hearted ‘Politicks’, and from this emerged a broad antipathy to Williamite Westminster 
shared by a diverse range of Jacobites, Tories and Country stalwarts. 
 
However, much criticism of the government came from within Westminster itself. One 
failing in particular received harsh words from politicians and pamphleteers alike: the 
regime’s unmistakable foreignness. As early as 1689, Sir Edward Seymour, a prominent 
Tory, claimed ‘in open parliament … “that all our trade and riches were carried to 
Amsterdam”’ and accusations of Dutch enrichment at the expense of loyal Englishmen 
recurred frequently in the years that followed.
92
 A striking example of this came early in 
1694, when food prices were rising to rates that had not been reached in decades. In January 
of that year, Sir John Knight, the fiery Tory MP for Bristol, made a speech in the House of 
Commons against a bill for naturalising foreign Protestants that focused squarely on current 
economic conditions. According to Knight, war and high taxes had left ‘poor English 
Manufactures’ unemployed and ‘starving’ whilst ‘all provisions are become excessive dear 
by the great quantities exported to Holland’. Naturalising immigrants would merely worsen 
the already precarious lives of ‘our Country men’ who would then face ‘the Choice of 
starving at home, or to turn Soldiers, and be sent to Flanders, and starve there for want of 
their pay’.93 Moreover, Knight’s claims were merely the extreme end of a broad spectrum of 
opinion in Parliament sceptical about its continental allies. In 1695, the House of Commons 
itself voted to present an address to the King which implicitly critiqued the supposedly 
excessive burden placed upon England, when compared to the Dutch, ‘in bearing the Charge 
in the present War’.94 Of course, such views were not confined to gentlemanly debates in 
Westminster. Knight’s speech, after all, was significant not only because of its unmistakably 
partisan interpretation of the country’s hardships but also because it was immediately 
published as a short tract that soon achieved ‘wide circulation’ far outside the halls of 
parliament.
95
 
 
Allegations of Dutch scheming, or at the very least complicity, featured prominently in public 
discussions of the apparently worsening economic situation. For example, as the House of 
Commons suggested in its 1695 address to the King, the nation’s wartime burdens seemed to 
be disproportionate to its minor stake in the struggle between France and the United 
Provinces. An oppositional ballad against the new Land Tax made the same point much more 
bluntly: 
To pay our just Taxes was once thought too much, 
But now extraordinary Charity is such 
We Bankrupt our selves for Maintaining the Dutch 
 Which no body can deny.
96
 
Another anonymous author surveyed in morbid detail ‘the dreadful Necessity’ that had 
befallen ‘the Commons of England’ since the onset of war and concluded by lamenting that 
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they suffered ‘all this to defend the Country of Strangers, not their own’.97 However, such 
complaints were mild compared to the numerous direct allegations of Dutch malevolence that 
circulated after the Revolution. One fictional Hollander wrote of how his compatriots used 
‘our Arts and Industry to ingross all the Trade into our hands’ and ‘utterly defeated all your 
Laws of Navigation’, even whilst encouraging the English to spend more money on the war 
effort.
98
 Particularly galling was the volume of bullion sent to the continent to pay for 
William’s campaigns. The Dutch had supposedly received so much silver and gold by 1691 
that some traders in England were already reduced to bartering in commodities, and by 1695 
a Jacobite could claim that such ‘villainous Depradation of theirs upon us’ would soon 
exhaust the kingdom’s coin causing ‘our utter Impoverishment and Ruin’.99 The shortage of 
cash, insinuated a seditious ballader in Lancashire, was probably a royal plot: 
Some Say the King contrived this Thing 
His duchmen For to Cherish 
For they will be Sure for to Indure 
When we poor Inglish Perish.
100
 
In addition to bullion, England’s food supply was also seemingly being usurped by Holland. 
It was repeatedly reported that ‘Dutch factors continue to buy up great quantities of corn, 
which make it bear a great rate here’.101 Thus, the English apparently lost their trade, money 
and food to their long-time rivals even whilst sacrificing blood and treasure to defend the 
forts and towns of their abusers. Samuel Grascome, the non-juroring clergyman and 
controversialist, published a short tract during the dearth of 1698-9 that brought together all 
these worries and drew the obvious conclusion. The ‘Hogen Mogens’, he said, ‘engross our 
trade’, ‘buy the Estates of our impoverished Gentry’, and ‘fetch away our Corn’ – yet, they 
did not strip the land of wealth and commodities ‘for any Want, but with design to compleat 
our Ruin’. Their ultimate plan was ‘to thin our Country, in hopes in time to be absolute 
Masters of it’ and turn free-born Englishmen into ‘Dutch Slaves’.102 
 
Fear of enslavement to Dutch overlords fuelled the hellish visions of political and economic 
oppression expounded by Jacobites. Whereas proponents of the Revolution saw France and 
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popery as the chief threat to liberty, their enemies believed that the true danger came from the 
Prince of Orange and his mercantile allies in Holland.
103
 Seen from this perspective, new 
fiscal impositions were not the unfortunate side effect of a virtuous war but rather the devious 
attempt of a foreign power to extract the nation’s riches. Hence, a Lancashire watchmaker 
named David Lenke pledged a toast to ‘King Williams Confusion’, decrying the window tax 
and other novel levies after hearing ‘that the King was building a great Palace in Holland 
which he said would be a Ruin to England’.104 Likewise, the quartering of soldiers, which 
could cause real hardship to overburdened localities, might be seen as more than merely an 
unpleasant but necessary responsibility – it could instead be interpreted as a direct attack on 
English rights and property. William Smart of Hertford, a weaver, denounced the practice and 
‘Swore Damn King William and A Pox take him for he and his Souldiers oppressed the 
Country more then ever King James did’.105 Although such explicit accusations of Williamite 
despotism were too dangerous to be a common public occurrence, they still circulated both in 
print and in conversation. 
 
At the heart of the most aggressive denunciations of the new government lay the idea of 
conspiracy. The nation’s apparent impoverishment was caused not by sly middlemen, nor by 
official bumbling, nor even by greedy office-holders. Instead, it was caused by a tyrannical 
alien ruler who hoped to enfeeble his newly acquired subjects so as to more easily subjugate 
them to his will. This perception was what stirred Samuel Grascome to speak of the ‘design’ 
of the invaders to become ‘absolute Masters’ and what drove Robert Morgan to deplore the 
‘State plott’ against the kingdom’s coinage.106 It also led many anonymous critics to warn 
their compatriots of ‘the tyrannous Project and Designs’ by which ‘William intends to bring 
us first to Beggary, and then into Thraldom’.107 A pamphlet published in 1694 laid out the 
Jacobite interpretation concisely. Under William’s rule, the people of England watched 
our Money given to the Confederates, our Ships to the French, our Trade to the Dutch, 
our Youth to the Slaughter, our Corn sent to Foreign Store-houses, and Foreigners in 
vast Numbers daily brought in upon us, who eat up our Bread, whilst our Poor are 
ready to starve. 
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Even worse, the rising misery was ‘not so much the hard Fate of the Times, as the Design of 
the State, who think they shall want no Souldiers if they can make Beggars enough’.108 Here, 
then, was an explanation which precisely inverted the Williamite view – a foreign-backed 
despot still threatened the nation with poverty and slavery, but the monster had been 
transformed from James into William. 
 
Each group of partisans thus traced the causes of current economic troubles to the malice of 
their political enemies. The result was a very public melee fought out in print and in speech 
between mutually exclusive interpretations of ‘the present state of England’. Yet, as has been 
seen, the debate involved more than merely two polarised opinions – a diverse range of 
causes were claimed by an equally diverse range of observers. Although some attitudes were 
rather conventional and apparently apolitical, a substantial number of people interpreted the 
nation’s afflictions in ways that had unavoidable political implications. 
 
 
* * * * * 
 
 
The intertwining of political and economic debates transformed the way many groups 
responded to the mounting hardships. As the new king’s enemies sought to capitalise on 
social discontent and as local disorders took on much wider implications, the potential for 
political instability rose. Soon even hungry crowds sometimes associated their plight with 
‘affairs of state’. The changes wrought by the Revolution also shaped the responses of the 
state itself, as the king and his parliaments adjusted to the new political environment. They 
rightly believed that government missteps might put the whole regime at risk. 
 
The danger of a Jacobite restoration was real. News of planned invasions and plots against 
the government circulated widely throughout the 1690s and, on more than one occasion, such 
schemes seemed to have a real chance of success.
109
 Moreover, opponents of the Williamite 
regime justifiably believed that the spread of economic hardship significantly heightened the 
possibility that the Revolution of 1688 could be completely reversed. Thus, when French and 
Jacobite forces prepared to invade in the summer of 1690, they reportedly sought to turn the 
English people against the new monarchs by printing and dispersing a declaration which 
claimed that ‘the great taxes and the decay of trade shal soon be remedied’.110 Other seditious 
pamphlets suggested similar remedies, arguing that ordinary citizens should ‘be their own 
Physicians, and prevent their Ruine’ by overthrowing the Dutch tyrant and restoring King 
James.
111
 Meanwhile, William’s supporters openly worried that such a scenario might soon 
come to pass. When a major conspiracy to assassinate the king was revealed in spring of 
1696, Abraham Pryme assumed that the plot had been launched in response of the disruption 
caused by the Recoinage Act.
112
 Indeed, more than one observer thought the government’s 
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currency policy might drive the poor to join with the French if they landed or would ‘open up 
a floodgate and let in King James and his bloody crew’.113 This suggests that the 
politicisation of economic conditions had made it significantly more likely that widespread 
resentment of the material hardships of the decade would spill over into a direct threat to the 
state itself. 
 
The spectre of popular rebellion which haunted Pryme and many of his compatriots did not 
materialise on the scale that they had feared, but it was not merely a figment of gentry 
paranoia either. There were, in fact, dozens of riots and tumultuous protests in response to the 
harsh economic conditions of the 1690s, some of which had conspicuous political 
implications. The sheer number of times that ‘the mob’ rose up in towns and villages across 
the country during William’s reign suggests that propertied observers had good reason to 
worry about the spread of disorder. The period witnessed at least forty food riots, eight 
recoinage disturbances and several excise riots as well as threatening ‘clamours’ from unpaid 
sailors, disbanded soldiers, and underemployed weavers.
114
 Most incidents seem, in 
retrospect, to have been localised protests that sought only official action against middlemen 
or special distributions of relief, thus obeying the conventions of the paternalist ‘moral 
economy’.115 Nonetheless, the extent of disorder at time led some observers to believe that 
the country would soon be torn apart by ‘Intestine Confusions’ and ‘great disturbances’, just 
as it had been ‘at the beginning of the greate Rebellion’ in the 1640s.116 A few individuals 
aimed at exactly that. At Norwich in 1691, for example, a man appears to have threatened a 
tax collector with a paper inscribed with ‘an act for a new Rebellion’, and in 1696 another 
man complained about ‘the diffiency of the Coyne’, saying ‘it would never be better till we 
goe together with our hats and our Clubbs’ to ‘get rid of … all the Kings’.117 Such cases were 
rare, but they must have magnified the sense of unease amongst propertied gentlemen 
worried about the weakness of the state’s authority in the face of increasingly grim economic 
conditions. 
 
In addition, some of the popular unrest of the 1690s had an overtly political component. As 
material hardship came to be seen though an ever-more partisan lens, previously innocuous 
instances of minor disorder could take on a seditious appearance. As such, the oft-repeated 
claim that the country’s rulers encouraged the export of grain to Holland, despite shortages at 
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home, seems likely to have motivated at least a few of the food riots that erupted during the 
decade, though the evidence is not conclusive. For example, the ‘mutiny’ against Dutch corn 
merchants at Colchester in November 1692 may have been linked to political animus against 
the king’s countrymen.118 Likewise, a local MP was accused of exporting corn from Norwich 
only a few months before ‘a Great Tumult of people’ riotously seized and destroyed a load of 
grain there in February 1699 – it would be surprising if these two outbursts were not 
linked.
119
 Over the summer of 1696, a whole series of events offer evidence that politicised 
interpretations of the coinage crisis drove people to collective action. In Newcastle, 
Derbyshire, Lancashire and Westmorland, crowds numbered in hundreds threatened ‘the 
Ministers of State & their [parliamentary] Representatives’, including Sir John Lowther, a 
prominent government spokesman in the Commons.
120
 The menace of popular violence also 
hung over Edward Clarke, the Whig MP, and his family in Somerset, where talk of a plot to 
raise ‘the mob’ to burn down his house and tear him ‘in pieces’ convinced a cousin to 
withdraw to a safer residence.
121
 Taken together, these events indicate that the growing 
importance of party politics in economic affairs could manifest itself in direct, physical 
threats against the regime and its representatives. 
 
The response of the state to these disorders was also affected by the changing political 
environment. The anti-absolutist rhetoric adopted by the Revolution’s defenders seems to 
have pushed the government away from dramatic acts of royal paternalism. Gone were the 
wide-ranging ‘books of orders’ issued by Tudor and early Stuart monarchs, despite the 
severity of the dearth that lingered through most of the 1690s. Instead, the new executive 
merely issued a few proclamations that reiterated old statutes and, on occasion, publically 
encouraged special collections for the poor of London during particularly hard seasons.
122
 
William and Mary also launched a campaign for ‘the Reformation of Manners’ which would, 
according to some of its supporters, help to reduce poverty by suppressing idleness and 
promoting industry, but it was neither managed by the court nor directly focused on the most 
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immediate economic problems of the era.
123
 Overall, partly because of the changed political 
culture in the wake of the Revolution, ostentatious royal intervention was minimal. 
 
The contrast with the manic activity in Parliament at this time is striking. Its expanded fiscal 
powers and regular meetings meant that it handled much more business than its predecessors, 
whilst frequent elections ensured that parliamentary debates became more partisan, even in 
the case of economic affairs. Hence, the ‘hard times’ of this decade were extensively 
discussed and many remedies were proposed. Yet the passing of statutes in response was 
usually slow and inconsistent.
124
 The erratic outcomes were not for lack of trying. For 
example, Jack Howe, a notoriously bold Tory M.P., infuriated ‘the Court party’ in 1695 when 
he asserted that Parliament – rather than the King - should control the proposed council on 
trade, because ‘we might be without a King, but not without a trade’. He claimed, in essence, 
that the parliamentary supremacy established in 1689 ought to be extended to fully 
encompass finance and foreign commerce. Howe’s brazenly irreverent attack on royal 
prerogative was soon defeated but it led one observer to suggest that ‘there was never such 
speeches in the House in any Parliament since that of ’41’.125 Less dramatically, both 
Commons and Lords launched enquiries into naval and commercial ‘miscarriages at sea’, 
including the notorious loss of the Turkey Fleet, which uncovered some corruption and 
embarrassed a few important officer-holders without actually offering any useful new 
policies.
126
 In both cases, the shift in political culture encouraged parliamentarians to seek 
solutions to the material hardships of their constituents, yet the process of law-making 
remained prone to partisan disruption and legislative inertia. For instance, although most 
members of Parliament were well-aware of the rising food prices and two bills to reform the 
‘assize of bread’ nearly passed, the proposals ultimately failed and the Commons only proved 
able to belatedly pass measures to temporarily prohibit the export or distillation of corn in 
1699.
127
 That said, despite the friction caused by partisan quarrels, two initiatives long 
associated with Whiggism – the ‘improvement’ of the poor and the ‘protection’ of domestic 
manufacturing – both received substantial parliamentary support after the Revolution.128 The 
new statutes for poor relief and protectionism probably provided no immediate respite for 
those suffering through the hard times of the 1690s, but their long-term effects were more 
consequential. 
 
To contemporaries, the concurrence of sudden political and economic change was very 
worrying indeed. Partisans blamed each other for the harsh conditions, adding considerably to 
risk of disorder and probably limiting the ability of the authorities to respond effectively. As 
crowds threatened to plunder the houses of unpopular parliament men and the government 
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failed to provide any suitable redress, the danger of another ‘Great Rebellion’ must have 
seemed very near. 
 
 
* * * * * 
 
 
The barrage of economic shocks that struck England so soon after the Revolution of 1688 had 
a profound impact on society during William III’s reign. They threatened the livelihoods of 
millions of people who had only very recently been enjoying an era notable for its relative 
peace and prosperity. In response, both supporters and opponents of the new regime promptly 
began to interpret the changing economic situation in political terms. Even more importantly, 
they often did so publicly and explicitly, feeding the hungry printing presses with reams of 
blatantly partisan accounts of the nation’s trade, taxes, money and food supplies. 
 
The evidence presented here of a fundamental shift in the nature and extent of economic 
discussion reinforces the conclusions of Tim Harris, Steve Pincus and others who have 
emphasised the ‘genuinely revolutionary’ effect of the events of 1688 on English society.129 
Both the direct political consequences of the Revolution and the wider changes in public 
discourse were felt far beyond the confines of Westminster. This helps us to understand the 
extraordinary public response to the severe material hardship that arrived in the 1690s. As 
Pincus notes, economic concerns ‘were front and centre in the partisan debates of 1695-96’, 
and he is right to emphasise the influence of party strife on arguments about political 
economy during this decade more generally.
130
 Yet Pincus’s claim that such discussion can 
be reduced to a ‘struggle between two competing modern economic programs’ is belied by 
diversity of the polemics and complaints recounted above.
131
 The revolution certainly 
produced some ideologically coherent Whigs and Tories who loudly partook in the debates 
about England’s economic challenges, but even more striking is the sheer cacophony of 
voices that emerged in the 1690s. Many of those who blamed the hardships of the 1690s on 
‘moneyed men’ or ‘parliament men’ were neither Tories nor Jacobites.132 Likewise, it was 
not only radical Whigs who saw French tyranny or popish conspiracy as the cause of 
commercial problems.
133
 In short, economic complaints were notably more politicised after 
1688, but not systematically polarised. Still, historians such as Pincus rightly insist that 
debates about the material impact of the revolution were widespread and often viciously 
polemical. The resulting anxiety and disorder reminded more than one witness of the anarchic 
1640s. 
 
Such comparisons were apt, for the imprint of the events of William’s reign visibly reshaped 
public life long after the immediate effects had faded from view. Although the threatened 
rebellion failed to materialise in the 1690s, there was nonetheless a significant shift in the 
way people responded to economic problems – a shift that appears to have revived and 
extended the politicised arguments that had briefly proliferated during the civil wars and 
interregnum. Debates about the role of the state in commercial and financial affairs exploded 
as more people than ever before joined the conversation as readers, writers, petitioners and 
protesters. The sheer volume of printed commentary on such topics grew considerably after 
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1688 and the totals tended to remain at levels much higher than typical of the seventeenth 
century throughout the Hanoverian era.
134
 In fact, this decade left a powerful legacy to the 
eighteenth century. 
 
The conjunction of political and economic debates after the Revolution of 1688 was by no 
means entirely novel, but does seem to have been transformed from an occasional 
coincidence into an enduring concurrence. It was the heady arguments of the 1690s that 
germinated the popular, politically inflected commentary on economic problems produced by 
Daniel Defoe, Jonathan Swift and their many successors.
135
 In addition, the rapid emergence 
of this strain of controversy in print soon spread to parliamentary deliberations and elections. 
From this point onwards, trade and taxation were central to political allegiances, lobbying, 
campaigning and voting.
136
 For example, during the ferocious controversy over the French 
Commercial Bill of 1713, the potential threat to the nation’s trade was relentless repeated in 
party polemic and on the hustings.
137
 Likewise, the bursting of the South Sea Bubble in 1720 
and the panic that ensued was very quickly turned into a weapon, first by the Tories and then, 
much more successfully, by Robert Walpole in his efforts to marginalise his enemies both 
within and without the new Whig regime.
138
 Meanwhile, in the same year, Parliament was 
pushed into passing a law against East Indian textile imports through a noisy, violent 
campaign of petitioning, pamphleteering and rioting by the London silkweavers, whose 
public spokesmen claimed that their hardship was a conspiracy hatched by ‘the Disaffected 
Party’.139 In the next decade, the emergent ‘patriot’ opposition turned the Excise Bill of 1733 
into a full-scale political crisis through their extensive extra-parliamentary mobilisation 
against the proposed extension of the tax.
140
 Moreover, according to Kathleen Wilson, during 
the co-ordinated anti-government mobilisations preceding and during the War of Jenkins’ Ear 
in 1738-42, the opposition ‘deliberately incorporated commercial and expansionist grievances 
into patriot ideology and the case against Court Whiggery, thus further enlarging its support 
out of doors’.141 Even food rioters – the most notoriously ‘conservative’ of protesters - can 
sometimes be found shouting revolutionary slogans in the eighteenth century.
142
 In all of 
these cases, it is not difficult to trace the roots of the rhetoric and social reach of these clashes 
to their precursors in the 1690s. The political discord that appeared in economic discussion 
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after 1688 unsettled contemporaries, but even the putative ‘growth of political stability’ in the 
early eighteenth century could not substantially reverse it.
143
  
 
 
Throughout most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, periods of widespread economic 
distress tended to be attributed to providential punishment for sin, profiteering by greedy 
middlemen or mismanagement by local authorities. Such interpretations remained common 
long after the Glorious Revolution, but they were increasingly joined by explanations that 
focused directly on the national political scene. Jacobite conspiracies, French absolutism, the 
moneyed interest, parliamentary corruption and even the new Dutch king were all presented 
as possible reasons for the distresses of the 1690s. Furthermore, as has been seen, these 
allegations were often made in public – circulated through alehouse conversations, 
manuscript libels and rapidly proliferating sheaves of printed polemic. Previous waves of 
politicised economic debate and public protest had swept through early modern England, but 
the wave that arose after 1688 crested higher than its precursors and only partly ebbed away 
in the years that followed. Open argument about the government’s success or failure in 
defending the livelihoods of its people was no longer unusual – it had become a permanent 
part of English society. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of titles per decade containing the terms 'trade', 'money' or 'tax'. 
 
